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ABSTRACT 
Capabilities to exchange health information are critical to 
accelerate discovery and its diffusion to healthcare practice. 
However, the same ethical and legal policies that protect privacy 
hinder these data exchanges, and the issues accumulate if moving 
data across geographical or organizational borders. This can be 
seen as one of the reasons why many health technologies and 
research findings are limited to very narrow domains. In this paper, 
we compare how using and disclosing personal data for research 
purposes is addressed in Australian, Austrian, Finnish, Swiss, and 
US policies with a focus on text data analytics. Our goal is to 
identify approaches and issues that enable or hinder international 
health information exchanges. As expected, the policies within 
each country are not as diverse as across countries. Most policies 
apply the principles of accountability and/or adequacy and are 
thereby fundamentally similar. Their following requirements create 
complications with re-using and re-disclosing data and even 
secondary data: 1) informing data subjects about the purposes of 
data collection and use, before the dataset is collected; 2) assurance 
that the subjects are no longer identifiable; and 3) destruction of 
data when the research activities are finished. Using storage and 
compute cloud services as well as other exchange technologies on 
the Internet without proper permissions is technically not allowed 
if the data are stored in another country. Both legislation and 
technologies are available as vehicles for overcoming these 
barriers. The resulting richness in information variety will 
contribute to the development and evaluation of new clinical 
hypotheses and technologies. 
CCS Concepts 
Security and privacy → Human and societal aspects of security and 
privacy →   Privacy protections and  Usability in security and 
privacy; Applied computing →  Life and medical sciences →   
Health care information systems and Health informatics;  Applied 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Health information includes all health-related content from all 
specialties, organizations, regions, territories, and countries. 
Examples include private personal data on electronic health 
records (EHRs) as well as health sciences papers and other 
publicly-available information on the Internet. Their electronic 
recording enables data to become potentially accessible through 
information and communications technologies (ICT) for the 
purposes of improving health and healthcare. These benefits are 
typically reached through supporting situational awareness, 
decision-making, and knowledge discovery, as is illustrated by the 
increasing popularity of text data analytics [1-3]. 
However, this promise only holds if the potential benefits outweigh 
the risks [4-8]. A major risk of compromising data subjects’ privacy 
is particularly evident in analyzing text (i.e., inabilities to be fully 
convinced that all privacy-sensitive information has been de-
identified both in the explicit text and in between its lines) or big 
data (i.e., unforeseen possibilities to infer personal data after record 
linkages from multiple de-identified sources); health information 
may contain patients or healthcare workers’ personal data such as 
identifiers, care details, and other sensitive matters.  
Consequently, storing and using them requires careful compliance 
with jurisdictional legislation, governance, and policies, for 
record/register research. To summarize their timeline 
internationally, in 1940s, the Nurnberg Code on for Human 
Experimentation was published; in 1960s, the Declaration of 
Helsinki on Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving 
Human Subjects was developed; in 1970s, some of the  first laws 
for protecting electronic data privacy were established in Europe 
and the Belmont Report for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research was created; in 1980s, the 
Lisbon Declaration of the Rights of the Patient was released and 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) adopted their framework, which addresses not only 
personal data and privacy protection but also movement of personal 
data across national borders; in 1990s and 2000s, similar 
frameworks by the European Commission (EC) and Asia-Pacific 
Economic Co-Operation Organisation (APEC) followed together 
with the US Personal Health Information Privacy Rule; and since 
2010s, EC has targeted individuals’ protection with regard to the 
globalization, new ICT, and processing of personal data with 
specific sections on processing of personal data concerning health 
and processing for historical, statistical, and scientific research 
purposes [9]. The most widely used legal frameworks in EHR 
information exchanges are the EC and US frameworks from 1995 
and 2002, respectively [10]. 
2. METHODS 
We addressed this information exchange problem from an 
international perspective by comparing Australian, Austrian, 
Finnish, Swiss, and US frameworks by extending a paper on 
Australian and Finnish frameworks [9]. We chose these countries 
to cover America, Australia, EU (Austria and Finland members 
since 1995), and non-EU Europe (Switzerland).  
We extracted the relevant legal frameworks from online databases 
of the legislative and other judicial information of Australia, 
Australian New South Wales (NSW), Austria, EU, Finland, 
Switzerland, Swiss Valais, the USA, and the US California, 
supplemented with information available on the websites of the 
jurisdictional ethics boards. We included both general frameworks 
for privacy protection and health specific ones.  
For each country, we addressed the following research questions: 
What are the relevant legal frameworks? How can the process of 
gaining access to authentic health information be characterized in 
terms of ethics approvals, research permissions, and data subjects’ 
informed consenting? How can data be exchanged, combined, and 
compared across jurisdictional borders or from a research project 
to another?  
3. RESULTS 
Even though international frameworks have an increasing role and 
harmonizing impact over the national, territorial, regional, and 
organizational frameworks, the requirements for data access and 
protection vary in states, territories, and cantons of the five 
countries (Table 1); each region significantly adds to the 
frameworks by establishing their own regulations and 
recommendations. 
The process of gaining access to authentic health information for 
the purposes of scientific, historical, or statistical projects is 
typically straightforward, well guided, and has the following five 
steps: First, preparations take place and include developing a 
research plan, forming a research group, naming its leader, and 
writing an ethics protocol that encompasses at least the following 
aspects: studying the governance, policy, and legal frameworks; 
assuring that the proper permissions are furnished and legislation is 
followed; monitoring that the permissions cover all aspects of 
project; specifying the purposes of data collection, including 
justifications for the relevance of the data to the research plan and 
the amount of data to be collected; specifying data collection, 
storage, and protection which includes data access, destruction, use, 
modification, and disclosure; preparing user agreements; educating 
the data users on research ethics; answering to questions on 
research ethics; monitoring that good research practice is 
conformed; and intervening in problems.  
Second, permissions are furnished: The study is accepted by chief 
officers of the jurisdiction. Ethics approvals are obtained from the 
approving authority, except in Austria and Finland, some projects 
are not subject to this. Research permissions are obtained at least 
from the each healthcare jurisdiction where data originate (and in 
some cases from the highest national health-authority); they may 
be granted for a defined goal, specific data type and gathering 
interval, and limited in time (as defined in the project’s ethical 
protocol). In Australia, Austria, and Finland, the processing of 
personal data is limited to purposes of health/medical sciences and 
historical/statistical studies. Finland requires additional research 
permissions from the Finnish Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
for projects that use personal data from more than one jurisdiction 
(i.e., municipality/municipality board) or from the private sector 
(i.e., private healthcare services or self-employed healthcare 
professionals). Applications are submitted for free to the Finnish 
National Institute for Health and Welfare and/or Finnish Medicines 
Agency and their review may take from three to twelve months. The 
Finnish Office of the Data Protection Ombudsman must be notified 
using a standardized form, if the project keeps a personal data 
register; transfers personal data to outside the EU or the European 
Economic Area; or launches an automated decision-support 
system. In Switzerland, furnishing ethics approvals and research 
permissions is amalgamated and examined by each larger 
healthcare provider and smaller canton’s own ethics commission.  
Third, data collection takes place for the purposes specified above. 
In general, the legislation in the five countries does not permit 
organizations to use or disclose personal data unless one or both of 
the following conditions applies: 1) Data subjects (the 
patients/customers and sometimes also the healthcare workers and 
informing clinicians) have been consented. 2) The use/disclosure 
has been specifically authorized/required by another law. In 
Austria, all data must be de-identified without delay so that the data 
subjects are no longer identifiable if specific project phases can be 
performed with indirectly personal data only. In Australia, this de-
identification is encouraged. The USA allows researchers to access 
to certain de-identified health information and specifies this de-
identification as follows: 1) removing all specific identifiers of the 
individuals and their relatives, employers, and household members 
or 2) obtaining a qualified statistical expert’s documented opinion 
stating that the remaining risk of identifying an individual is very 
small. Data gathering and de-identification, typically by the  
  
Table 1. Comparison of the five countries 
 Australia Austria  Finland Switzerland USA 
Frameworks Australian Government, 
Office of the Australian 
Information 
Commissioner Privacy 
Act 1988 at 
www.oaic.gov.au/ 
NHMRC National 
Statement on Ethical 
Conduct in Human 
Research, 2007 at 
www.nhmrc.gov.au/guid
elines-publications/e72 
The Austrian Data 
Protection 
Commission/Authority. 
Austrian Federal Act 
concerning the Protection 
of Personal Data, DSG 
2000 at 
www.dsb.gv.at/site/6274/
default.aspx 
European Parliament, 
Council. Directive 
95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and 
of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the 
Protection of Individuals 
with regard to the 
Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free 
Movement of such Data. 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/homepage.
html 
(EC (2012): Proposal 
AND Report on Proposal 
for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament 
and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals 
with regard to the 
Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free 
Movement of such Data 
(General Data Protection 
Regulation). Brussels, 
Belgium) 
Statutes of Finland at 
www.finlex.fi: 
Act on Electronic 
Prescriptions 61/2007,  
Act on Private Health 
Care 152/1990, 
Act on the National 
Personal Data Registers 
for Health Care 
556/1989,  
Act on the Status and 
Rights of Patients 
785/1992,  
Act of Reading Health or 
Social care client 
information 159/2007,  
Criminal Code of Finland 
39/1889, 940/2008, 
Decree of Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health 
about Patient Records 
298/2009,  
Health Care Law 
1326/2010,  
Law on Medical 
Research 488/1999, 
794/2010, and 
Personal Data Act 
523/1999. 
EC Directive 95/46/EC 
(and the 2012 EC 
proposal and report) 
National/cantonal 
principles relatively 
similar to the EC and 
international 
frameworks; see the 
Swiss eHealth strategy at 
www.e-health-suisse.ch 
US Department of Health 
& Human Services. 
Health Information 
Privacy. The HIPAA 
Privacy Rule 2002.  
http://www.hhs.gov/hipa
a/for-
professionals/privacy/ind
ex.html 
Highest 
authority 
Department of Health 
and Ageing, National 
Health and Medical 
Research Council 
Ministry of Health Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health 
Ministry of Health U.S. Department of 
Health & Human 
Services 
Regional 
differences 
Each state/territory has 
its own legislation. E.g., 
in NSW, 
www.legislation.nsw.gov
.au: 
Health Records and 
Information Privacy Act 
2002 (NSW),  
NSW Health Privacy 
Manual, Version 2, 2005, 
NSW Health Electronic 
Information Security 
Policy, Version 1, 2005,  
Privacy and Personal 
Information Protection 
Act 1998 (NSW) 
(Practically) none None Each canton has its own 
legislation. E,g,, for the 
canton of Valais, see 
www.swissethics.ch/ek_d
etail_pages/vs_f.html 
Each state/territory has 
its own legislation. E.g., 
in California the 
California 
Confidentiality of 
Medical Information Act, 
www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-
bin/calawquery?codesecti
on=civ  
Ethics approval 
required for 
Any health information 
acquisition or work with 
patients beyond routine 
care 
Any work with patients 
beyond routine care. 
Exception:  
Non-interventional 
studies (NIS, i.e., studies 
that observe and collect 
data on the application of 
approved medicinal 
products, devices and 
procedures) are in 
general not subject to 
ethics clearance if they 
do not deal with 
identifiable biosamples 
or datasets. However, 
such projects may still be 
subject to “Good 
Scientific Practices” as 
established at the 
respective institution. As 
far as registries are 
concerned, some Ethics 
Committees refer to 
“Volume 9A of The 
Rules Governing 
Medicinal Products in the 
European Union”, in 
particular to Table I.7.A 
that deals with post-
authorization safety 
studies, i.e. refers to 
pharmacovigilance issues 
(ec.europa.eu/health/files
/eudralex/vol-
9/pdf/vol9a_09-
2008_en.pd). 
Furthermore, NIS need to 
be registered with the 
“Bundesamt für 
Sicherheit im 
Gesundheitswesen”. 
Any health information 
acquisition or work with 
patients beyond routine 
care. 
Exception:  
Record studies without 
connections to invasive 
studies do not require a 
medical ethics approval. 
Any health information 
acquisition or work with 
patients beyond routine 
care or quality control 
of machines 
Any health information 
acquisition or work with 
patients beyond routine 
care or quality control 
Approving 
authorities 
The Australian Health 
Ethics Committee 
supported by territorial 
and site 
specific committees 
The 27 Ethics 
Committees in Austria 
whose jurisdiction 
depends on where the 
healthcare provider 
involved in a clinical 
research project 
is located 
The National Committee 
on Medical Research 
Ethics (TUKIJA, 
www.tukija.fi) and its 
sub-committees for the 
five university hospital 
districts. TUKIJA gives 
statements on studies that 
involve patients and that 
are invasive in nature 
(either physically 
or mentally) 
For large hospitals (e.g., 
Geneva), the hospital’s 
ethics commission.  
For smaller hospitals 
(e.g., Sion), cantonal 
ethics commissions 
Internal Review Boards 
(IRBs) of institutions 
holding healthcare data 
Forms The NEAF National 
Ethics Application Form, 
which may need to be 
supplemented with 
territorial applications. 
www.neaf.gov.au 
Standardized forms (e.g., 
Antrag auf Beurteilung 
eines klinischen 
Forschungsprojektes) 
Standardized forms of 
TUKIJA, dependent on 
the project type, that may 
need to be supplemented 
with the standardized 
forms by the hospital 
districts 
Each commission has its 
own standardized forms 
and structure for an 
application. 
Each IRB has its 
own forms. 
Review times The committees meet 
every month. 
Approximately three 
months starting with 
submission, the larger 
committees meet 
approximately ten times 
per year. 
The committees meet 
once or twice a month. 
The hospital 
commissions meet 
regularly and the 
cantonal commissions 6-
8 times per year. 
Some institutions meet 
every week, others 
fortnightly or monthly. 
Review costs 0 – over 5,000 USD, 
depending on commercial 
sponsorships of 
the project 
0 – over 5,000 USD, 
depending on project 
factors like commercial 
sponsorships and multi-
centricity 
0–3,000 USD, depending 
on commercial 
sponsorships of 
the project 
0–1,000 USD, depending 
on the canton 
0 USD 
Data subject Patient/customer 
Healthcare workers 
Patient/customer 
Informing physician 
Patient/customer Patient/customer Patient 
Using/dis-
closing 
identifying 
information for 
scientific, 
historical or 
statistical 
purposes is 
NOT permitted 
without data 
subjects’ 
informed 
consent unless 
Specific authorization or 
requirement by another 
law: health information 
can be used and disclosed 
for health and medical 
research purposes in 
certain circumstances, 
where researchers are 
unable to seek 
individuals’ informed 
consent; if it is not 
practicable to consent 
data subjects, de-
identified information 
should be used and if also 
this option is unavailable, 
identifying information 
may be used if the 
proposed medical project 
has been approved by a 
properly constituted 
Human Research Ethics 
Committee. 
Data are publicly 
accessible; have been 
lawfully collected for 
other research projects or 
other purposes; or are 
only indirectly personal. 
Other data shall only be 
used under special 
conditions, in particular 
if they are pursuant to 
specific legal provisions 
or with the consent of the 
data subject or with a 
permit of the Austrian 
Data Protection 
Authority.  
Data subjects’ informed 
consent is needed in 
particular for data that 
have been collected in 
previous trials or for 
routine clinical treatment. 
Informed consent forms, 
which clearly state how 
data will be processed, 
are a central part of the 
Ethics Committee 
submission already.  
The research cannot be 
carried out without data 
identifying the person 
and the consent of the 
data subjects cannot be 
obtained owing to the 
quantity of the data, their 
age or another 
comparable reason; the 
use of the personal data 
file is based on an 
appropriate research plan 
and a person or a group 
of persons responsible 
for the research have 
been designated; the 
personal data file is used 
and data are disclosed 
therefrom only for 
purposes of historical or 
scientific research and 
the procedure followed is 
also otherwise such that 
the data pertaining to a 
given individual are not 
disclosed to outsiders; 
and after the personal 
data are no longer 
required for the research 
or for the verification of 
the results achieved, the 
personal data file is 
destroyed or transferred 
into an archive, or the 
data in it are altered so 
that the data subjects can 
no longer be identified. 
The amount of 
consenting work is not in 
relation to the amount of 
protection required or 
many of the potential 
subjects’ might be 
deceased,  etc. 
Limited datasets in which 
identifiers have been 
removed and situations in 
which it is impractical to 
contact data subjects. 
Information 
exchanges 
possible if 
The transferring 
agency/organization 
(A/O) remains 
accountable for these 
data, unless at least one 
of the following three 
conditions applies:  
1) Data subjects have 
been consented  after 
being expressly advised 
that the consequence of 
providing consent is that 
after the transfer, the A/O 
will no longer 
accountable for the 
individual’ personal data.  
2) The A/O is required or 
authorized by or under 
law to transfer the 
personal data. 
3) The transferring A/O 
reasonably believes that 
the data recipient is 
subject to a law, binding 
scheme, or contract 
which effectively upholds 
privacy protections that 
are substantially similar 
to these principles.  
At least one of the 
following three 
conditions applies:  
1) Data subjects have 
been consented. 
2) The exchange has 
been authorized by the 
Austrian Data Protection 
Authority. 
3) Data are only 
indirectly personal. 
At least one of the 
following three 
conditions applies:  
1) Data subjects have 
been consented.  
2) The protection of the 
privacy and the rights of 
data subjects is 
guaranteed by means of 
contractual terms.  
3) The country in 
question guarantees an 
adequate level of data 
protection.  
Additional permission 
are needed for data from 
more than one 
jurisdiction or from the 
private sector. 
Specifically requested in 
the ethics protocol and 
the proper permissions 
have been furnished 
Data users are approved 
by their organizational 
review boards 
healthcare service provider or an organization such as the 
Australian Centre for Health Record Linkage, may be subject to 
substantial fees and sometimes also delays. 
Fourth, research, where the transferred data are used only for the 
purposes specified above, takes place; otherwise Steps 1-3 must be 
repeated. Researchers’ abilities to move and combine data across 
geographical or jurisdictional borders is important not only for 
collaborative and comparative purposes but also for availability of 
storage and compute cloud services (e.g., by Amazon, Dropbox, 
and Google): the cloud may not only forbid the storage and 
processing of personal data in its user agreement but also use 
computer servers that are physically located overseas, leading to 
trans-border information exchanges. In general, trans-border 
information exchanges are permitted with data from the five 
countries if it has been specifically requested in the ethics protocol 
and the proper permissions have been obtained. For academic 
partners this can, in some cases, be easier to obtain than exchanges 
with commercial goals.  
Fifth, data destruction is performed as specified in the ethics 
protocol. Typically, this means deleting all data or returning it to 
the jurisdiction when the research activities are finished (e.g., 
Finland and Switzerland). Justifying the exchange of original data 
or even derived resources (i.e., secondary data) is often difficult, 
because data subjects should have been informed about all purposes 
of data collection and use before data collection (e.g., all our five 
countries) and this information disclosure can occur only after 
assuring that individuals are no longer identifiable (e.g., Austria, 
Finland, and the USA). The requirements are particularly difficult 
in evolving research activities and in data mining projects, where 
the aim is to infer new, previously unknown information from data. 
For example in Austria, there is currently no generally accepted 
process for disseminating health data from one research project to 
another secondary use; processes take place – so far – on an 
individual and case-by-case basis and many people fear that 
secondary use of the national EHR data could lead to unwanted 
transparency and serve for unwanted control purposes [11].  
4. DISCUSSION 
The frameworks differ between the five countries and their regions, 
but the differences within each country are not as substantial as 
across countries and because most frameworks apply the principles 
of accountability and/or adequacy they are actually fundamentally 
similar. In the accountable principle, the original creator of the 
personal data register is accountable for regulatory compliance 
unless the accountabilities are specified separately, as in the APEC, 
Australian, and US frameworks, whilst in the adequacy principle, 
the subsequent information receiver must protect privacy 
adequately, as in the Australian and EC frameworks. 
ICT can be built not only to enforce and audit compliance with all 
frameworks and framework updates simultaneously but also to 
prevent the possibility of accountability and adequacy violation in 
exchanging health information [12]. Building this preventative ICT 
that implements core privacy principles, adopts trusted network 
design characteristics, oversees accountability and adequacy will 
bolster trust in such systems and promote their adoption [13]. Such 
ICT for EHR exchanges between China and Japan has been 
introduced [14, 15]. Moreover, an access control scheme and other 
security designs applicable for these privacy-sensitive data have 
been designed for cloud computing and wireless networking [16-
18]. Finally, ICT to automatically de-identify EHR text have been 
evaluated to reach the F1 correctness percentage from 81 to 99 in 
English, French, Japanese, and Swedish [19-24]. Approximately 
ninety per cent of the residual identifiers left behind by either these 
ICT or human coders can be concealed by applying additional 
computation methods [25]. 
However, similarly to our conclusion on differing frameworks, 
current ICT and architectures for health information exchanges are 
also very different when comparing between countries or 
jurisdictions [26]. Moreover, evolving healthcare and science (e.g., 
ICT development in non-research organizations or exchange of 
secondary data) and lessons learnt in information exchanges calls 
also for continuous improvements to enforcement mechanisms in 
the existing law and data subjects’ consenting [13, 27-30].  The 
attitudes of 62 US patients toward electronic health information 
exchanges have been studied [31]. Regardless of their enthusiasm 
about their capacity to improve the quality and safety of healthcare 
through the exchanges, they are also concerned about the potential 
of these exchanges to result in data misuse and compromised 
privacy. Consequently, they want more information about data 
subjects’ consenting. 
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